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Summary
This thesis aims to answer two questions utilizing Norwegian data for 2007; 1)
what is the distribution of taxes and public spending across different income
deciles and household types? and 2) taking this into account, how does it affect
income inequality and poverty?
The first step in answering the two questions is to estimate the distribution of
taxes. While all direct taxes are obtained immideatly from data, indirect taxes
requires a different approach. Data from the Consumer Survey’s of Statistics
Norway is used together with effective tax shares of consumer prices to find
indirect taxes paid. When looking at income deciles, consumption expenditures
are not known, so these are estimated in an Almost Ideal Demand System. The
last tax distributed is the payroll tax, under the assumption of inelastic labor
supply. Corporate taxes are left out of the analysis because of no clear consesus
regarding the incidence assumptions. Summing the different taxes together, I
find the distribution of taxes as share of income for all groups, where the total
average tax rate is 46,3%.
Moving on to public expenditures, these are distributed in two steps. First,
direct cash transfers are obtained and distributed directly from available data.
The value of public services is distributed according to an allocation rule derived
from a theoretical framework. All municipal- and county-provided services are
covered. In addition to these, I also impute the value of public hospitals. The
value of public services is assumed to be equal the cost of providing them. Since
the allocation of public spending is likely to reflect the allocation of needs in the
population, these values are needs-adjusted according to estimated equivalence
scales drawn from the same model which was used to derive the allocation rule.
Finally, the fiscal incidence - the incidence of all (covered) taxes and all (covered
) public expenditures is estimated for all household types and income deciles.
I find that there are large variations in the fiscal incidence across groups.
Typically “weak” (retiree-abundant groups and lone parents) and poor house-
holds recieve large amounts of public expenditures relative to what they pay in
taxes. This is a reflection of the redistributional properties of the fiscal bud-
get. There are also relatively large differences in the fiscal incidence for certain
groups before and after needs-adjusting. For households who are not a typical
risk-group in terms of poverty but still recieves a large amount of public spend-
ing, such as couples with small children, the fiscal incidence changes from being
a net recipient of public services to being a net financieer when needs-adjusting.
Knowing the incidence of taxes and public spending, I move on to answering
the second question; does this change the degree of economic inequality? For
instance, since public expenditures cater to many poor groups, what happens
to economic inequality when recieved public goods are added as an income
component?
Comparing the Gini-indicies for different income measures I find that the
traditional approach (estimating a Gini-coefficient for the distribution of cash
income net of direct taxes) produces a higher measured inequality than when
accounting for the provision of public services and additional taxes. Accounting
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for indirect taxes, the payroll tax and in-kind public services, the Gini-coefficient
is reduced from approximately 0.237 to 0.182. I also find that the poverty
incidence is reduced by 11 - 13% when taking the fiscal incidence into account.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality and redistribution has always been an important topic within
economics, but the recent two decades have funneled the two topics into the
limelight of the economics debate. Many OECD countries saw from the early
1990’s to the mid 2000’s increasing income inequality. Norway is no exception
(OECD 2008). Motivated by this fact, this master thesis seeks to look closer at
the redistributional properties of the fiscal budget.
The traditional approach to answering such a question is to compare the
Gini-index after direct taxes and cash transfers to a (hypothetical) Gini-index
before the same taxes and transfers. This approach has three weaknesses.
First, the Gini-index before taxes and transfers (i.e. before the public sec-
tor) is not known. Even after “giving” each household/individual back the paid
taxes and subtracting the transfers recieved, we fail to account for any behav-
ioral changes caused by the taxes and transfers in the first place. We therefore
compare, in a sense, two allocations at the same existing equilibrium, when
we instead should have looked at two separate equilibra. Unfortunately, the
“pre-government” equilibrium is unkown and a correct general equilibrium com-
parison is impossible.
Second, when looking at the distribution after direct taxes, we fail to account
for other taxes. Indirect taxes, as well as the payroll tax, are likely to have an
impact on economic inequality as they are not uniformally distributed among
the population.
Third, income inequality measures after taxes and transfers are often inter-
preted as inequality in economic welfare. However, by excluding the value of
in-kind public services, such as public hospitals and education, they fail to ac-
count for approximately half of the public sector’s expenditures in most western
countries (Chamberlain & Prante 2007) . Considering the fact that at least some
components of the direct taxes deducted from households are used to finance
these services, they should certainly be accounted for. Overall, excluding the
value of public services gives a distorted picture of economic well-being.
While little can be done about the first point, this thesis aims to extend the
literature by looking at the two latter, using data on the Norwegian economy
for 2007. In principle, I aim to answer two questions:
(1) What is the fiscal incidence across population groups? The fiscal inci-
dence is simply the distribution of taxes and public spending for different parts
of the population. In addition to looking at the distribution of cash transfers
and direct taxes, it aims to incorporate indirect taxes and the payroll tax, as well
as the value of public services imputed to households based on their utilization
of these services. This ought to give a more complete picture of the incidence
and the redistributional properties of the fiscal budget. Knowing these values,
we can also easily answer a second question, namely; (2) What is the effect on
the income distribution when the fiscal incidence is taken into account? Does
including all taxes and the value of public services affect income inequality?
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‌ Since answering these questions requires a rather data-rich and vast analysis,
it might be worthwile to settle certain methodological issues before embarking
on the task.
Population groups Grouping the population according to some measure is
the most practical approach to such an enquiry. This requires deciding along
what dimension we want to compare the population. Of course, when looking at
income inequality the obvious choice is by comparing different income groups.
In order to get a closer description of the distribution of economic welfare, it is
common to look at the distribution of income per consumer unit, i.e. equivalent
income. The concept of equivalent income will be more closely discussed later in
the text. Income statistics for Norway is usually reported according to income
deciles1. This means that the population has been “lined up” in ascending
order according to equivalent income net of direct taxes and then divided into
ten equally-sized groups. These income deciles are the first grouping of the
population used in this thesis.
In addition to income groups, a sensible approach is to look at different
household types. Since especially transfers and public services are to a large
extent distributed according to demographic factors, comparing different house-
hold types, is likely to give extra insight when looking at the fiscal incidence
across the population. It is also, of course, crucial when looking at the effects
on income inequality, as the imputed value to each income decile is likely to
depend on the household types within that group.
While an income decile is self explanaining, the respective household types
covered in this thesis are listed in table 1.
1Students are left out of the analysis when looking at income deciles.
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Table 1: Household types and household shares
Household type (abbreviation) Share of all households
Single, below 30 yrs (A,0-29) 8%
Single, 30-44 yrs (A,30-44) 8%
Single, 45-66 yrs (A,45-66) 12%
Single, 67 → yrs (A,67->) 11%
Couple, without children, oldest person below 30 yr (PUB,0-29) 1%
Couple, without children, oldest person 30-44 yrs (PUB,30-44) 2%
Couple, without children, oldest person 45-66 yrs (PUB,45-66) 11%
Couple, without children, oldest person 67 →yrs (PUB,67->) 8%
Couple, with children, youngest child 0-5 yrs (PB,0-5) 11%
Couple, with children, youngest child 6-17 yrs (PB,6-17) 12%
Couple, with children, youngest child 18 yrs (PB,18->) 4%
Single parent, youngest child 0-5 yrs (S,0-5) 1%
Single parent, youngest child 6-17 yrs (S,6-17) 4%
Single parent, youngest child 18→ yrs (S,18->) 2%
Source: Statistics Norway
Note: One household type, multi-family households, are excluded from the anal-
ysis. This is the reason why the population shares do not add up to one.
Because of the relatively aggregated data, certain assumptions about the
underlying distributions have to be made. These are listed in Appendix A.2.
What is income? Throughout the thesis, I will frequently mention both “in-
come”, “non-cash income” and “extended income”. A natural precision is then of
course to specify what these income measures mean. “Income” is defined as the
sum of factor incomes (labor and capital), net income from self-owned enter-
prises and cash transfers. It does not account for the value of home-production
and “imputed rents” from owning a home. “Non-cash income” is the value of
in-kind public services imputed to the household while “Extended income” is
simply income plus non-cash income.
Equivalence scales Third, as household types vary in size and composition,
how can we ensure comparability across them? A sensible approach is to derive
so-called equivalent income, similar to what is done when creating the income
distribution. The logic behind this is illustrated by a simple example. Consider
two households, one single-individual household and one consisting of a couple
with two children. Clearly, 100’000 NOK in household income is not the same
for the first household as the latter in terms of welfare. The latter household
would require a higher income to maintain the same standard of living. In
addition to that, dividing income on the number of household members is not
a sufficient approach, as there are significant economies of scale with respect to
intrahousehold consumption. In order to overcome this problem, the standard
approach is scaling income according to equivalence scales (Lind 2001). An
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equivalence scale therefore attempts to quantify how we need to scale the cash
income of a certain household in order for it to be able to attain the same welfare
level as a reference household. The reference household typically consists of one
adult individual. Three of the most common equivalence scales being utilized
in the literature are the EU-scale, the OECD scale and the root scale. The EU
scale weighs the second adult as 0.5 “consumer units” and each child by 0.3,
while the OECD scale weighs the second adult as 0.7 and each child by 0.5.
The root-scale weighs household income by the square root of its total number
of household members. According to these three equivalence scales then, a
household consisting of two adults and one child would require 1.8 (EU), 2.2
(OECD) and
√
3 (root-scale), respectively, times the income of a single adult
individual to achieve the same standard of living. In general, there is no consesus
on what is the most approriate equivalence scale.
Adding non-cash public services into the analysis calls for a different set
of equivalence scales. In principle, the allocation of public services is likely
to reflect the allocation of needs across the population. Thus, not accounting
for this is likely to lead us to overestimate the distributional impact of public
services. Because of this, needs-adjusted equivalence scales (Aaberge et.al 2010)
are estimated in order to weigh extended income. This is more thoroughly
discussed in chapter 3.
Two problems with regards to the usage of equivalence scales are commonly
cited. The first problem was illustrated above - there is no consesus on which
is the “correct” equivalence scale. The choice of equivalence scale is therefore
somewhat arbitrary. This is of course unfortunate as the choice of equivalence
scale will affect the results.
A second problem, of a more theoretical nature, is the so-called “Pangloss-
critique” (Lind 2001). The critique arises from the derivation of equivalence
scales and the implicit assumption it makes that households are maximizing
a welfare function of equally weighted individual utilities. However, it is likely
that the households will put different weights on the utility of various household
members. I will not focus particularly on this here - for a detailed discussion
see Lind (2001). Because of this, there is an underlying assumption here, and in
other similar studies such as [14], that the benefits are distributed uniformally
across all household members.
All in all, to ensure comparability, I will use the following equivalence scales.
Cash income will be equivalized with the household’s corresponding EU scale.
Non-cash income is scaled using estimated equivalence scales attempting to
account for different needs. Extended income is then scaled using a combination
of the two. These topics are further discussed in chapter 3.
The valuation of public goods The fourth clarification needed to be made
is how we value public goods. This is perhaps the most fundamental of all
empirical issues in similar studies. In principle, pure public goods should be
valued according to the individual’s willingness to pay for the good. However,
this imposes enormous informational requirements. One possible solution could
4
be to undertake surveys asking a reprepsentative sample of the population their
willingness to pay or willingness to accept for certain public services. This
corresponds to finding the equivalent or compensating variation of the agents.
Unfortunately, a vast literature has pointed out and discussed numerous chal-
lenges with this approach, see for instance Horowitz & McConnell (2000).
Because of this, virtually all fiscal incidence studies (De Wulf 1975) value
public services according to the cost of provision. This is the case here as well.
Which public goods to include? Fifth, it should be decided upon which
public services to include. In principle, all public services should be included into
the analysis, but because of informational requirements this may prove difficult.
The provision of public services in Norway occurs at three levels; municipally,
countywise and statewise. For 2007, a similar analysis found in Aaberge et.al
(2010) provides relevant estimates for all municipally provided services. I utilize
these estimates when imputing the value of public services, hence the value of
all municipally provided services are included. This is the reason why 2007 is
the point of departure for this thesis. More on this in chapter 3. Furthermore,
I extend the analysis in Aaberge et.al (2010) to include county-provided public
services, enabling me to fully account for public service provision at the county
level. When it comes to state-provided goods, I include the value of public
hospitals. This is the only good at the state-level covered in this thesis. Most
other goods provided by the state, except higher education, are in principle pure
public goods, however. Excluding these from the analysis will lower the levels
of absolute and relative fiscal incidence, but are not likely to have a decisive
impact on the variance across groups.
Inequality measure Sixth, in order to measure the impact of fiscal inci-
dence on income inequality, an inequality measure has to be chosen. Numerous
indicies and ratios exist in the literature. In this thesis, I considered using ei-
ther of the two most popular; the Gini-index or the Bonferroni measure. As
will be discussed in chapter 3, the Gini-index appeared more approriate for the
methodology employed. Therefore, inequality is measured by estimated Gini-
coefficients.
‌
This thesis is structured as follows2. The next chapter is dedicated to the
distribution of taxes across the population. Chapter 3 then distributes public
expenditures. The value of public services is allocated to population groups
according to an allocation rule, derived from a theoretical framework of how
a social planner behaves. Chapter 4 merges the results of the two preceeding
chapters in order to answer the two key questions of this thesis; what is the
fiscal incidence across groups and what happens to income inequality once this
is taken into account? Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the methodology used,
as well as possible pathways for future research. Chapter 6 concludes.
2All calculations and estimations in this thesis have been done utilizing MS Excel 2007
and OxMetrics 6
5
2 The distribution of taxes
This chapter investigates the distribution of taxes during the fiscal year of 2007.
Appendix D contains relevant intermediate results. The purpose of this chapter
is to enable me to incorporate other taxes than just the direct taxes when looking
at the fiscal incidence and its impact on income inequality. While direct taxes
is the most obvious “burden” in terms of economic welfare to most households,
indirect taxes should also be accounted for because they, to some extent, imply
higher consumption prices. In addition to this, the payroll tax should also be
taken into account because it results in a real burden to households in terms
of lower net wages. Corporate taxes are not included here. These are excluded
because of no clear consesus of incidence assumptions in the literature (Wolff
& Ajit 2004). See subsection 5.1.5 for a brief discussion. The other incidence
assumptions are presented in table 2.
Table 2: Tax incidence assumptions
The inequality measure of choice
Tax type Incidence assumption Datasource
Direct taxes Not shifted Statistics Norway
Payroll tax Shifted to the worker Statistics Norway
Indirect taxes See table 3 Statistics Norway/MSG
Source: Author
2.1 Direct taxes
Direct taxes consist of all taxes that cannot be shifted on towards someone
who is not legally liable to pay the tax. These taxes are the labor income tax,
capital gains tax, regular wealth tax and the property tax. While the capital
gains tax (flat at 28%), the wealth tax (1,1% for values above 700’000 NOK,
1’400’000 NOK for couples) and the property tax (municipally determined) are,
once activated, flat, the labor income tax feature progressive components. The
tax rate is increased step-wise, twice, as income increases. In addition, there
is a deductable amount of up to 87’200 NOK that is exempted for taxation.
There are also heterogenous tax rates across the household type dimension -
the deductables depend on which tax class (1 or 2) the individual belongs to,
which again depends on family type. For instance, single parents with children
below the age of 18 belongs to tax class 2 and have higher tax deductables than
someone living in a couple with similar aged children. Variation in direct taxes
is therefore likely to be caused by three factors; varying income levels, varying
composition of income and varying household types. The direct tax rates paid
by the different income deciles and household types are calculated with data
from Statistics Norway’s Income Statistics.
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2.2 Indirect taxes
Indirect taxes can be divided into two main categories; value-added taxes (MVA/VAT)
and excise taxes. A complete list of all indirect taxes in Norway are given at
Regjeringen.no (2012).
While direct taxes are unshiftable, the payers of the indirect taxes are not
necessarily the ones legally liable to pay the tax. For instance, a tax on the
production of a certain commodity, originally meant to be paid by the producers,
may be shifted towards the consumers in terms of higher prices. Standard public
economics theory predicts that the size of this effect depends on supply and
demand elastisities (Rosen & Gayer 2008). In order to investigate how much
the various population groups pay in indirect taxes I therefore need to settle
two issues.
First, the tax as share of consumer price for a given commodity or commodity
group has to be known. This is determined by the imposed tax rate and the tax
incidence/elasticity assumption. Second, when budget shares/expenditures for
the various commodites cannot be directly obtained from available data, they
have to be estimated.
With regards to the first point, these values are obtained for 2006 from the
simulations of MSG, a general equilibrium model from Statistics Norway (Heide
et.al 2004). Since the 2007 tax shares are not accessible, I have to assume that
there is no structural difference between the 2006 and 2007 tax rates. Since the
same parliament composition was in place during both these years3, this is likely
to be a plausible assumption, given no large shifts in the relative distribution of
market power between producers and consumers.
The MSG estimated tax shares are given in table 3.
Table 3: Effective tax rate as share of consumer price
Category Effective tax rate 2006
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0,13
Alcohol and tobacco 0,57
Housing and fuel 0,07
Car 0,49
Clothing and shoes 0,20
Furniture and home-related goods 0,19
Culture and recreational 0,21
Health services 0,09
Transportation 0,07
Postal- and telecom-services 0,20
Other 0,10
Average 0,16
Source: MSG (Heide et.al 2004)
3and I am unable to find any reforms/large shifts in the indirect taxation regimes between
the two years.
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Knowing the effective indirect tax rate, what remains for the allocation of
indirect taxes is to know how much, on average, the various population groups
spent on the respective consumption categories. When analyzing household
types, data are easily obtainable from the Consumer Surveys of Statistics Nor-
way. Consumption expenditures on category X is then multiplied by the effective
tax rate of category X in order to determine the amount of indirect taxes paid.
When looking at different income groups, a bit more work is required. Be-
cause of lack of directly applicable data4 the average consumption expenditures
on various consumptions goods across different income groups needs to be esti-
mated. The estimations are outlined in appendix B.
Once these are known, the average incomes in each income group have to be
estimated as well. They are obtained by taking the nationwide average post-tax
equivalent income and applying the formula
Neti =
Average ∗Disti
10
(1)
whereNeti denotes the average post-tax equivalent income in decile i, Average
denotes the nationwide average equivalent income and Disti denotes the share
of total income that decile i holds. Average is obtained from EuroStat and was
246’177 NOK per consumer unit in 2007. The distribution of average equiv-
alized income is obtained from Statistics Norway. Utilizing these values, the
estimated average incomes for all income deciles are given in table 4.
Table 4: Estimated post-tax equivalent income
Decile Income
Decile 1 98470
Decile 2 150168
Decile 3 174785
Decile 4 196941
Decile 5 214174
Decile 6 233868
Decile 7 256024
Decile 8 283103
Decile 9 327415
Decile 10 526818
Source: Author
The estimated average equivalent incomes are then multiplied with the esti-
mated consumption rates, obtained from Halvorsen (2011), before the predicted
budgets are used in the estimated demand system to obtain predicted consump-
tion expenditures on the respective categories. Once these are known, the in-
direct taxes paid are found by multiplying these values with the effective tax
rates from table 3.
4Consumption expenditures are reported for given income classes, but these classes do not
match the ones in the income distribution.
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2.3 The payroll tax
Finally, the last tax to distribute is the payroll tax. The justification for dis-
tributing the payroll tax to the households is inelastic labor supply, something
which has been frequently documented. For the Norwegian case, an excellent
reference is Sollie & Svendsen (2001). Employers are the ones legally liable of
paying the tax, but because of inelastic labor supply, employees end up bearing
the burden in terms of lower net wages. The payroll tax varies in the interval
0 - 14,1 %, depending on geographical location. The nationwide average is 13%
(Regjeringen.no 2010). Self-employed pay a payroll tax of an average of 11%.
From the income statements, the respective labor and net incomes from self-
owned enterprises can be derived for each population group. The payroll tax
rates are then multiplied with the relevant incomes.
2.4 Summing the taxes together
Adding all the different taxes together, the total distribution is given in figure
1,2 and tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: Total taxes as share of income, according to household type.
Household type Total taxes as share of income
A,0-30 0,49
A,30-44 0,47
A,45-66 0,44
A,67-> 0,34
PUB,0-29 0,48
PUB,30-44 0,48
PUB,45-66 0,46
PUB,67-> 0,37
PB,0-5 0,46
PB,6-17 0,46
PB,18-> 0,44
S,0-5 0,32
S,6-17 0,39
S,18-> 0,40
Source: Author
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Table 6: Total taxes as share of income, according to income decile.
Income decile Total tax rate
Decile 1 0,34
Decile 2 0,35
Decile 3 0,40
Decile 4 0,43
Decile 5 0,46
Decile 6 0,48
Decile 7 0,50
Decile 8 0,52
Decile 9 0,55
Decile 10 0,60
Source: Author
Figure 1: Total taxes as share of income, according to household type
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Source: Author
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Figure 2: Total taxes as share of income, according to income decile
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Source: Author
From the estimated distribution of taxes, we can point out a few things.
First off, looking at table 6 and figure 2, we see that the Norwegian tax
system is progressive, with total tax rates increasing with equivalent income.
The income tax is more progressive than the other type of taxes. Indirect taxes
and payroll taxes offset the progressive effect on the tax rate of increased in-
come5. Overall, the lowest income decile pays approximately 34% of their total
income in taxes, while the richest decile pays approximately 60%. The average
tax rate increase as we move up one income decile is 2,8%-points. The nation-
wide average tax rate is 46,3%. Note that the lowest decile pays a relatively
high tax share. This is likely to be caused by the inclusion of many high-wealth
individuals who have no taxable income but pay high wealth taxes.
Second, there is type-wise heterogeneity as well - see table 5 and figure 1.
While some of the variation is likely to be caused by varying income levels, it is
still reasonable to believe that there are type-specific variation because of the
type 1/type 2 classifications. Typical “weak” groups such as retiree-abundant
household types (A,67-> & PUB,67->) and single parents with small children
(S,0-5) end up paying a substantially lower tax rate than other groups. Among
those who pay the highest tax rate I found young single individuals and couples
without children in working age. These groups pay approximately 50% of their
income in taxes on average. The weaker groups identified above pay between
30-40% in taxes on average.
‌
5See the results in appendix D for verification.
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Figure 3: The composition of taxes, according to household type
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Figure 4: The composition of taxes, according to income group
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Source: Author
From figure 3 and 4, we see that the composition of taxes varies across
the different groups, with predictable patterns emerging. For instance, retiree-
abundant groups pay a relatively low amount of payroll taxes. For these groups,
as well as lone-parents with young children (S,0-5), indirect taxes are a relatively
large share of total taxes compared to other household types.
When looking at the various income deciles (figure 4), the composition of
taxes is somewhat more stable. Direct taxes account for about 50% of all taxes
for all groups.
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3 The distribution of public spending
The purpose of this chapter is to distribute public spending across the popula-
tion. Including the value of this will give a more complete picture of the fiscal
incidence. It will also allow me to measure the impact of public services on
income inequality.
To distribute the value of public services, a theoretical model (referred to as
the ABLM-model in the text) will be used to derive an allocation rule. I will
first look at the distribution of cash transfers however.
3.1 Transfers
Transfers can in general be divided into two categories; tax-free and taxable.
Tax-free transfers from the public sector comprises of child-support (kontantstøtte
and barnetrygd), living support, social help, student stipends and various, smaller
transfer schemes. The taxable transfers are pensions, both age and disabillity
related, contributions in relation to sickness and “day-money” for the unem-
ployed. Transfers form an important component in the overall redistributional
role of the public sector.
When looking at income groups, I do not have available data of composition
of transfers, only the total amount as share of income. This is presented in
figure 5.
Figure 5: Transfers as share of income, according to income groups
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Source: Statistics Norway’s Income Statistics
The transfer system appears highly progressive, meaning that transfers as
share of income decreases relatively sharp as we move up along the income
distribution. For the poorest 10%, transfers account for over 50% of total in-
come, whereas the richest decile have approximately 5% of their total income
as transfers from the public sector.
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Moving to the different household types, the distribution of transfers is given
in figure 6.
Figure 6: Transfers as share of income, according to household types
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Source: Statistics Norway’s Income Statistics
The same pattern as when looking at taxes emerge - weak groups such as
retirees and lone parents recieve a relatively large share of their income in the
form of transfers from the public sector.
Figure 7: Composition of transfers, according to household types
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Source: Statistics Norway
Not surprisingly, the majority of transfers are taxable, with the exemp-
tion of transfers targeted towards families with children. These families have a
larger share of their total transfers in the form of tax-free transfers. A,0-29 and
PUB,0-29 also recieve a relatively large amount of tax-free transfers because of
a relatively large concentration of students within these household types.
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3.2 Public services
In this section, the value of public services will be imputed to the household
types. This is non-cash income. Non-cash income is important for both the
fiscal incidence and the (extended) income distribution. Public services are
valued according to the cost of providing them, hence the total benefit is equal
the total cost (there is no aggregate externalities). A theoretical framework, the
ABLM-model, is used to 1) derive an allocation rule and 2) create equivalence
scales for non-cash income which attempts to account for different needs in the
population. The model is taken from Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]).
‌
Consider a social planner (i.e. a local government) with a rational preference
relation  over the allocation of public expenditures across various sectors and
population target groups.
‌
Definition 1. A target group is defined as a population group who has
identical needs for a specific service. If there are k target groups for service i,
indexed j = 1, 2, ..., k, and Zji denotes the set of all members of target group j
in sector i, Zji ∩Z−ji = Ø, where Z−ji is any of the other k-1 sets. In words, no
individual is a member of more than one target group for each service.
‌
The preference relation of the social planner can be represented by a general
monotonically increasing ( is locally non-satiated) utility function,
V = V
 s∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
βij(xij − γij)
 (2)
where γij can be thought of as the subsistence quantity per person of service
i targeted to group j.γij can also be interpreted as the percieved minimum need
of target group j on service i. We can think of this parameter as being centrally
determined, for instance by expert opinion. βij is the marginal budget share for
spending on group j in service sector i and xij is additional spending in sector
i on target group j. Let there be a total of s sectors, i ∈ {1, 2, ....., s} (and k
target groups, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} as in definition 1).
Resources are scarce. The social planner maximizes V with respect to a
budget constraint (where taxes and thus income are treated as exogenous. In the
Norwegian case the parliament determines the level of taxes and the distribution
of tasks among municipalities and counties.)
y =
s∑
i=1
pii
k∑
j=1
xijzj =
s∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
uijzj (3)
pii is the cost of providing one unit of “output” in sector i and may vary
across districts and sectors. zj is the population share of target group j. Simply
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put, equation (3) tells us that total income has to equal total costs67.
Furthermore, the unobserved unit-cost parameter can be specified in the
following way
pii = pii0
[
1 +
∑
h
piih(ph − ph)
]
(4)
where h is geographical area h which provides service i. Since the set of
services provided by both the municipalities and the counties is empty, I avoid
double-counting.
ph is a variable that affects units costs in at least one of the service sectors
and ph is the mean of that variable across all h. An example of such a variable is
population density, which is likely to lead to economies of scale in the provision of
at least some services. The parameter pii0 can be interpreted as the average price
level in sector i. In the empirical application of this model, this is normalized
to 1.
The optimal allocation of public spending across groups and sectors is found
by taking the supremum of (2) with respect to (3).
In order to solve the model, an explicit functional form of V has to be
assumed. In Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]),V is assumed to be of the Stone-Geary
form
V =
s∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
βij log
(
xij − γij
γij
)
(5)
Having assumed this functional form, we can solve the model by maximizing
(5) with respect to (3).
Combining the necessary first order conditions for maximum we obtain the
linear expenditure system
uijzj = piiγijzj + βij
y − s∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
piiγijzj
 (6)
s∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
βij = 1 (7)
Equation (6) tells us that total expenditure on service i allocated to target
group j is equal the subsistence expenditures plus discretionary income (in-
come that is left once all subsistence expenditures are covered) allocated to that
group8.
6Prices are unobserved. What we do observe however, is total spending which is equal∑s
i=1
∑k
j=1 uijzj , where uij is spending per capita on service i for target group j.
7Note that budget surplus/deficit is treated as a residually determined sector.
8Note that γij = 0 for some i,j, as certain target groups are excluded from consuming
certain public goods. For instance, one target group is single individuals above the age of 67,
however they will not recieve the service “primary education”.
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If the allocation of spending on i to target group j, uij , is not observable, (6)
is not of much help in terms of the empirical application. To work around this
problem, Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]) imposes the following multiplicative structure
on the marginal budget shares:
βij = βiθij (8)
s∑
i=1
βi = 1 (9)
k∑
j=1
θij = 1 (10)
where βi is the marginal budget share for service sector i and θij is the
share of sector-specific discretionary income in service sector i that is allocated
to target group j. Inserting the restrictions above into (6) and summing over
target groups yield
ui = pii
k∑
j=1
γijzj + βi
y − s∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
γijzj
 (11)
where the left hand side is expenditure per capita in service sector i. The
total minimum quantity in sector i is
∑k
j=1 γijzj . The monetary value of this, in
addition to discretionary spending on sector i, given by βi
(
y −∑si=1∑kj=1 γijzj),
adds up to total per capita spending on the respective service sectors. The in-
tuition behind (11) is that per capita spending on sector i is equal to the cost
of satisfying the needs of all the target groups plus the total amount of discre-
tionary spending allocated to that sector.
So far, this model can account for differences in spending according to three
factors; different needs (γ), different demographic structure (z) and different
prices (pi). In addition, we’d like to add the possibility of different “tastes”
of the social planners across regions (in reality, different tastes across different
local governments). This can arise for numerous reasons, such as different local
governing parties and cultural norms. The ABLM-model incorporates this by
letting
βi = βi0 +
∑
h
βihth (12)
s∑
i=1
βi0 = 1 (13)
s∑
i=1
βih = 0 (14)
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where th is a “taste-vector”, enabling different municipalities and counties to
have different preferences for allocating discretionary income. Examples of vari-
ables which might be incorporated into the taste-vector according to Aaberge
et.al (2010 [2])is the amount of socialists (defined as social democrats and all
parties “left” of them in the political spectrum) in the local council, average ed-
ucation level in the population and so forth. A crucial assumption is that these
variables affect the allocation of discretionary income only, and not subsistence
expenditures.
If we assume that the sector specific discretionary income that is allocated
to target groups is proportional to the respective minimum quantities, we can
write θij as
θij =
γij∑k
j=1 γijzj
(15)
‌
Knowing this, we can finally solve for the spending per individual in the
target group j on service i
uij =
γij∑k
j=1 γijzj
ui (16)
This is the allocation rule. The allocation of public services will therefore
only require two steps;
1. The identification of target groups
2. The estimation of minimum quantities for each target group across all
services.
Both steps are covered in the next subsection.
3.2.1 Estimation
In Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]), table 3.4, estimates of minimum quantities are pro-
vided for all municipally-provided services. To allocate these services to the
different population groups, I directly use these estimates in the allocation rule.
The same table also provides an identification of target groups (Table 3.5 and
A.1 also provides the estimates for the price- and preference- related variables.).
The municipal services imputed to the households are (with target group in
paranthesis): Administrative services (all), primary education (residents aged
6-15), After-school and adult education (residents aged 6 - 15 and recentily
domiciled refugees 20-59 years), child care (all children aged 1- 5, separated ac-
cording to working status of guardians), health care (all), social services (poor
and unemployed 16 - 59, remaining recently domiciled refugees 0 - 59, remain-
ing divorced or separated 16-59), child protection (poor children 0 - 15 with
lone parent, poor children 0 - 15 with couple parents, non-poor children 0 - 15
with lone parent and non-poor children 0 - 15 with couple parents), long term
care (population 0 - 66, population 67 - 79, population 80 - 89, population 90
18
and above and mentally disabled individuals above 16 years), culture (all) and
infrastructure (all).
In order to extend the coverage of public services, I apply the model above
to estimate the minimum quantities of county-provided goods. In principle, I
divide county-prodivided goods into four categories; secondary schooling, den-
tist services, culture and administrative services. The last sector comprises of
admistration costs, local support for businesses and infrastructure. This sector
is denoted “Administration”.
Summary statistics are given below.
Table 7: Summary statistics, per capita spending, county-service sectors.
Sector Mean St.deviation Min Max
Secondary schooling 4708 674 3281 6110
Dentist services 377 123 192 627
Administration 19 14 12 78
Culture 49 26 6 103
Source: KOSTRA.
Total of 76 observations.
In order to estimate the parameters, I specify the following system of equa-
tions, in total 4;
ui = α+ γijzijh + δipih + ζth + errori (17)
where α, γ, δ, ζ is vectors of constant terms, coefficients measuring the effect
of a one-individual increase in target group j on the spending on service i,
coefficients measuring the effect of a one-unit increase in factors affecting the
price of providing service i and coefficients measuring the effect of a one-unit
change in a variable that is postulated to have an effect of local preferences,
respectively. To account for differential prices I include the population density
of the county. To control for different tastes across regions I include the share
of the population with at at least 1 year of higher education and the average
per capita wealth tax paid.
The system is estimated simultanouesly by maximum likelihood estimations
where the error terms are assumed to have a multinormal distribution with zero
mean and unrestricted covariance matrix. It was also estimated by regular OLS.
Both techniques produced of course the same parameters, and the standard
errors were of largely the same magnitude (no shift in significant/insignificant
status). Verification of the latter was the reason why OLS was undertaken in
addition to MLE.
The results, as well as the identification of target groups, are presented in
table 8. For other coefficients and issues related to the estimation of (17), see
appendix C.
The estimated parameters measure how much spending on service i increases
when target group j increases with one person. These parameters are used in
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the allocation rule specified by (15) to determine per capita spending on service
i and target group j. The allocation of these values are then imputed to the
various household types based on a set of probabilities of the different household
types being a member of the respective target groups, on an individual basis.
These probabilities are based on demographic data from Statistics Norway. For
instance, for the group S,0-5, the allocation of public services is based on the
minimum quantities as well as probabilities that the adult member is a part of
various target groups. Then, the value of child services are imputed according
the minimum quantities and the probability of a child in the age 0-5 being a
part of various target groups, multiplied with the average amount of children for
the household type. Finally, the imputed non-cash income for the adult and the
(expected amount of) children is added together to find the household group’s,
on average, unscaled non-cash income.
‌
What is common for the services above is that they are imputed directly
to target groups based on their cost of provision. Some goods, such as public
hospitals are however commonly imputed by utilizing the “insurance-principle”
(Freund & Smeeding 2006). Before I present the total non-cash income for the
various household types, these services have to be treated accordingly.
Insurance services A justification for the approach above is that the spend-
ing of the public sector on providing certain services would closely resemble the
hypothetical market prices that agents would pay if they were to obtain them
there.
However, some public services might be viewed differently, such as services
related to health. If agents were to obtain these goods in the market, they would
pay differential prices, depending on their expected utilization of the service.
Therefore, imputing the same value across all household types when expected
utilization rates are heterogenous is not optimal.
Such services are therefore treated as insurance goods. In this thesis, these
goods are general health care and public hospitals. General health care is cov-
ered by the municipalities and its minimum quantities when the entire popula-
tion is a target group is given in (Aaberge et.al 2010 [2]). It could be argued that
other municipal services should be treated as insurance goods as well, such as
social services, child protection, long-term care and dentist services. However,
because of the relatively large amount of target groups defined in the estimation
of the corresponding minimum quantities, heterogenous values are ensured. For
health care however, the target group is all residents, creating a homogenous
minimum quantity for all individuals.
To overcome this problem, (Freund & Smeeding 2006) suggests an insurance
based approach at which health care expenditures per capita is scaled according
to an “insurance”-multiplier. These multipliers are derived from empirical work
on US data and the allocation of health expenditures. Keeping individuals aged
19-34 as a reference group, health care multipliers are found to increase with age.
For the age groups 0-18, 19-34, 35-54, 55-64, 65-74 and 75-> the multipliers are
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0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.75, 3 and 4 respectively. These multipliers are derived from the
relative spending of each population group compared to the base group. How-
ever, relative health care expenditures are found to vary substantially over time.
Since the latest estimates are from the US in the early 90’s, I feel uncomfortable
applying them to data for Norway for 2007.
To overcome this problem, I propose a somewhat different approach, based
on available and applicable data.
First, I impute municipal health services to the households based on the
following formula
costh = cost · ˆmgenh (18)
where cost is the average per capita cost of municipal health care services
and ˆmgenh is the multiplier
ˆmgenh =
Probh(user)
Prob(user)
· consultationsh
consultations
(19)
where Probj(user)Prob(user) is the probability of household type h being a user (having
consulted a general practitioner within the last twelve months) relative to the
average probability of being a user, and consultationsjconsultations is the, given user = 1,
average number of consultations for group h relative to the average number
of consultations of the average user. The multiplier is therefore larger for one
group relative to another if i) it is more likely that they will end up using the
service, ii) given that they actually use it, their frequency of usage is higher or
iii) both.
ˆmgenjh is used on the assumption that, on average, the service each patient
gets from one consultation at a general practitioner is equal across all groups.
The defense of this assumption is that , except for different frequency and prob-
ability of usage, the service each household type recieves is relatively similar.
For instance, general practitioners focus on tasks such as check-ups, recommen-
dation for specialists, etc. These services are fairly equal in terms of the cost
of providing them, and scaling health care expenditures according to ˆmgenh is
therefore likely to be a suitable way of distributing their costs.
All variables needed to estimate ˆmgenh for the various household types are
available from Statistics Norway Health Surveys. For lone parents, there is no
differentiation between the age of the children. In these cases, the average for
the entire group is used.
For public hospitals however, it is imperative to adopt a more sophisticated
approach. The data also allow me to. There are enormous differences in the
costs of providing a liver transplant compared to a consultation with a specialist.
Therefore, differences between population groups may, for an identical numbers
of visits, play out as large differences in costs. As a response to this, hospitals in
Norway utilizes DRG-points, where 1 DRG represents the “average”-patient and
the treatment he/she gets.A relatively simple procedure such as a standard op-
eration on feet is equal to 0.55 DRG-points, while an operation on the thyroidea
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is 1,21 DRG-points. More complex procedures, such as a liver-transplants, have
far higher DRG-weights.9.
Accumulated annual DRG-points are known for the age-groups 0-15, 16-49,
50-66 and 80-> for both sexes. If all individuals had been equal, the share
of total DRG-points would be equal to the population share of the respective
groups. For groups who are more frequent users or users of more expensive
services, the share of DRG-points will be larger than their population share. I
therefore propose the following insurance multiplier for public hospitals, both
somatic and psychological services included
ˆmhosj =
DRG,%j
population,%j
(20)
where the numerator and denominator are shares of total DRG-points and
population shares, respectively. The average per capita cost of public hospitals
is then allocated to each group j based on
costpubj = costpub · ˆmhosj (21)
where ˆmhosj is the estimated multiplier for each reported population group
and costpub is the average per capita cost of public hospitals. The multiplier for
each household type h, ˆmhosh is then based on the probability that a member of
j is a member of h multiplied with the corresponding multiplier for all relevant
j.
The estimated multipliers, both ˆmgenh and ˆmhosh, based on data from
Statistics Norway’s Health Surveys and the Norwegian Patient Register for 2007
where the DRG-statistics is reported, are given in table 9.
9For a precise overview over the different services provided and the corresponding DRG-
points, see Helsedirektoratet.
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Table 9: Estimated health multipliers
Household type ˆmgenh ˆmhosh
A,0-29 0,9 0,49
A,30-44 0,92 0,54
A,45-66 1,12 1,08
A,67-> 1,12 3,06
PUB,0-29 0,93 0,99
PUB,30-44 0,93 1,09
PUB,45-66 0,94 2,16
PUB,67-> 1,05 6,12
PB,0-5 0,85 1,90
PB,6-17 0,84 1,91
PB,18-> 0,94 2,66
S,0-5 1,28 1,22
S,6-17 1,28 1,19
S,18-> 1,28 1,57
Source: Author
Note that ˆmgenh is originally estimated on the household level, while ˆmhosh
is estimated on an individual level. Therefore, larger households will also have
larger ˆmhosh. The difference between the ages is most easily observed when
comparing single-individual households (A,0-29, A,30-44, A,45-66 and A,67->).
From the table above we can see that there is little relative variation in the
utilization of general practitioners, with elderly groups and single parents being
more frequent users. The variation in imputed health care costs will therefore be
relatively small. However, when looking at public hospitals there are relatively
large differences, with a single individual above the age of 67 having 306% higher
imputed costs than the per capita average. Note that factors other than age or
sex are assumed to not affect the households’ hospital multiplier.
Total non-cash income Finally, having imputed health related services ac-
cording to the insurance principle, total non-cash income is dervied from simply
adding the value of all services together for each household type.
The estimated non-cash incomes for the various population groups are pre-
sented in table 10.
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Table 10: Estimated non-cash income
Household type Average non-cash income
A,0-29 33662
A,30-44 33327
A,45-66 42618
A,67-> 110104
PUB,0-29 66353
PUB,30-44 65639
PUB,45-66 83786
PUB,67-> 218881
PB,0-5 204403
PB,6-17 255480
PB,18-> 116444
S,0-5 162811
S,6-17 185225
S,18-> 75455
The variation in non-cash income reflects that the prioritized groups are
retiree-abundant types, as well as parents with children in the age 0-17. These
groups recieve a relatively large amount of public services because of long-term
care institutions, pre-school, primary school and secondary school. To get a
feeling of the magnitude of these services, non-cash income as share of cash-
income is given in table 11 for all types.
Table 11: Non-cash income as share of cash income
Household type Non-cash/Cash
A,0-29 0,13
A,30-44 0,09
A,45-66 0,11
A,67-> 0,47
PUB,0-29 0,11
PUB,30-44 0,08
PUB,45-66 0,10
PUB,67-> 0,43
PB,0-5 0,25
PB,6-17 0,26
PB,18-> 0,11
S,0-5 0,50
S,6-17 0,42
S,18-> 0,13
The groups who recieve the largest amount of public services relative to their
cash income (where public transfers are included) are groups such as A,67->,
25
PUB,67-> S,0-5 and S,6-17. For these groups, the value of public services
accounts for 47%, 43% , 50% and 42% of their cash income, respectively.
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Before these values are combined with the results in chapter 2 to provide
estimates of the fiscal incidence and the effect on the Gini-coefficient, the non-
cash values have to be needs-adjusted.
3.2.2 Needs-adjusting the value of public services
Why needs-adjust? As Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]) points out, a reason why
certain population groups recieve relatively large amounts of public spending
is because they need a high amount. This is important to take into account,
otherwise we would overestimate the redistributional effect of including these
services. In the model outlined above, high needs is equivalent with having a
high sum of subsistence expenditures across sectors. To account for the different
needs, needs-adjusted equivalence scales are estimated.
Estimating needs-adjusted equivalence scales In Aaberge et.al (2010 [2])
and Aaberge et.al (2010 [3]) , a methodological framework for the estimation of
these scales is outlined. For a derivation, see the original sources.
In principle, because of the non-cash income component, extended income is
scaled differently than cash income. The equivalence scale for extended income,
as suggested in Aaberge et.al (2010 [3]) , is given by the formula
NAh = θrCIh + (1− θr)
∑
j
nhjNCj (22)
which is a special case (prices are assumed to be homogenous across mu-
nicipalities and constant) of the general needs and price adjusted equivalence
scale of Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]).h denotes household and nhj is the number of
members of household h in target group j. We have that
θr =
yr,med
yr,med +
∑s
i=1 uir
(23)
where r denotes the reference group (in this thesis I use single adults aged
30-44 as reference group because they are the group who are recipients of the
least amount of public services), med denotes the median observation, CI is the
equivalence scale for cash income (I use the EU-scale) and NC is the non-cash
equivalence scale for target group j given by
NCj =
∑s
i=1 uij∑s
i=1 uir
(24)
NC will be bigger for groups who are recipients of many public services
relative to the reference group. This is where the needs-adjustment comes into
play.
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From (22), we see that the equivalence scale for extended income varies
across groups because of household composition and the relative amount of
public goods recieved. Households recieving more public goods will, all else
equal, have a higher equivalence scale. This is because their percieved needs are
higher, and non-cash income thus has to be corrected for it.
Applying equations (22), (23) and (24) to the estimated per-capita expen-
ditures and median income I estimate the equivalence scales for all household
types. This is reported in table 12.
Table 12: Extended income equivalence scales
Household type CI NC NA Needs-index
A,0-29 1 1,07 1,01 1,01
A,30-44 1 1 1 1
A,45-66 1 1,27 1,02 1,27
A,67-> 1 3,30 1,16 3,30
PUB,0-29 1,5 1,99 1,53 0,99
PUB,30-44 1,5 1,96 1,53 0,98
PUB,45-66 1,5 2,51 1,57 1,25
PUB,67-> 1,5 6,56 1,86 3,28
PB,0-5 1,855 6,13 2,16 1,56
PB,6-17 2,021 7,66 2,42 2,05
PB,18-> 2,48 3,49 2,56 1,16
S,0-5 1,46 4,88 1,70 1,92
S,6-17 1,41 5,55 1,70 4,08
S,18-> 1,98 2,26 2 1,13
Source: Author
Note: Needs-index is obtained by taking the non-cash equivalence scale of house-
hold h divided by the expected amount of household members.
Applying (23) as well as the value of public services for the reference group,θr
is estimated to be approximately 0.87.
Finally, applying these scales on cash income and non-cash income, extended
and needs-adjusted extended income for each group are calculated. This is
reported in table 13. Needs-adjusted extended income will be the basis for the
extended income distribution.
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Table 13: Equivalent non-cash and extended income
Household type Extended income Needs-adjusted extended income
A,0-29 289462 285690
A,30-44 400227 400227
A,45-66 398118 384331
A,67-> 344104 285164
PUB,0-29 629853 403765
PUB,30-44 824139 528925
PUB,45-66 864986 539243
PUB,67-> 727681 373934
PB,0-5 1011603 451849
PB,6-17 1208680 479228
PB,18-> 1131244 434349
S,0-5 485211 274168
S,6-17 619625 348631
S,18-> 634755 311657
Source: Author
‌
Armed with estimates of the value of public services imputed to households,
as well as the distribution of taxes, we can finally set out to answer the two
questions of this thesis. What is the fiscal incidence across population groups?
What happens with income inequality once we take it into account? This is the
topic of chapter 4.
4 Fiscal incidence and the income distribution
Definitions If we index each population group by j, for both the income-
and the type-grouping, fiscal incidence can either be measured as relative fiscal
incidence or absolute fiscal incidence.
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Definition 2. Let taxes, as share of income for each group, be denoted
τ , and transfers as share of income be denoted ρ. Then, the relative fiscal
incidence, Ψ, for group j is given by
Ψj =
ρj
τj
(25)
‌
In other words, we can think of the relative fiscal incidence as how much
each population group gets in transfers per tax-krone. Since ρ and τ are frac-
tions with the same denominator, this is of course equivalent with taking the
absolute value of transfers divided by the absolute value of taxes. A number
larger than one means that the respective group gets back more in the form of
public expenditures than what they pay in taxes. A number in the interval [0,1)
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means that the respective group gets back less in the form of public expendi-
tures relative to what they pay in taxes. A number equal one indicates that
expenditures recieved and taxes paid are equal.
‌
Definition 3. Let total taxes for each group be denoted by T , and total
transfers be denoted by P . Then, the absolute fiscal incidence, Φ, for
group j is given by
Φj = Pj − Tj (26)
‌
In other words, we can think of the absolute fiscal incidence as how much each
population group get in expenditures, net of taxes. A positive number means
that the respective population group is a net reciever of public expenditures. A
negative number means that the respective population group is a net provider
of public expenditures, also referred to as a net financieer. Note that, in order
to ensure comparability across households, these numbers should be equivalence
adjusted, using the equivalence scales estimated in chapter 3.
4.1 The fiscal incidence across household types
What remains is applying equation (25) and (26) to find the relative and absolute
fiscal incidence for each household type. The results are given in table 14, 15
and figure 8&9.
Table 14: Relative fiscal incidence according to household type, non-equivalent
income and equivalent (needs-adjusted) income
Household type Relative fisc. inc Relative eq. fisc. inc
A,0-29 1,01 1,00
A,30-44 0,82 0,82
A,45-66 1,58 1,47
A,67-> 7,83 5,9
PUB,0-29 0,75 0,62
PUB,30-44 0,56 0,48
PUB,45-66 1,06 0,90
PUB,67-> 5,56 4,00
PB,0-5 1,65 0,94
PB,6-17 1,35 0,62
PB,18-> 0,99 0,86
S,0-5 8,67 5,67
S,6-17 3,59 1,93
S,18-> 1,72 1,63
Source: Author
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Figure 8: Relative fiscal incidence, equivalent (needs-adjusted) and non-
equivalent income
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First, according to non-needs-adjusted extended income, the groups who re-
cieve most expenditures relative to taxes paid are S,0-5, A,67-> and PUB,67->.
These groups recieved an estimated 8.67, 7.83 and 5.56 per tax krone, respec-
tively, in municipal- and county-provided services, as well as public hospitals.
This is a product of being a target group for many transfer schemes such as
retiree-benefits and single-parent benefits, as well as recipients of many in-kind
services such as long-term care institutions and kindergardens.
Among those who appear to be the worst off are groups who typically are not
eligible for any special government programs. They end up as net financeers of
the public sector. These are working couples without children and single working
individuals.
Adjusting for needs, we see that the change in relative fiscal incidence for
all groups is negative for all (except the reference group of course). The biggest
change in relative fiscal incidence numbers when needs-adjusting is found for
households with children. For couples with children aged 0 - 17, the fiscal inci-
dence is actually reduced from being above 1 to below 1, meaning that they move
from net recipients to net financieers once we account for the percieved needs.
The groups who appear as winners in the sense that they have a relative fiscal
incidence above 1 are lone parents with children, as well as retiree-abundant
groups.
Note that, when we needs-adjust, we transform the value of public services
to an equivalent value, comparable across all households. When needs are taken
into account (and since public expenditures are allocated proportional to needs,
by equation (15)) this equivalent value will be equal to the public service value
imputed to the reference household10.
10To see this a bit more clearly, consider the total public spending imputed to household h.
This is given by
k∑
j=1
nhj
s∑
i=1
uij =
k∑
j=1
nhj
s∑
i=1
(
γij∑k
j=1 γij
ui
)
(27)
Similarily, the total imputed value to the reference household, consisting of one individual,
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Because of this, the relative and absolute equivalized fiscal incidence will
depend on this size relative to equivalized taxes and cash transfers.
Table 15: Absolute fiscal incideince, equivalent (needs-adjusted) and non-
equivalent income
Household type Absolute fisc. inc Absolute eq. fisc. inc
A,0-29 762 427
A,30-44 -16172 -16172
A,45-66 52118 42827
A,67-> 272005 195227
PUB,0-29 -32046 -32272
PUB,30-44 -87360 -68672
PUB,45-66 13686 -13405
PUB,67-> 494181 216861
PB,0-5 132103 -5648
PB,6-17 90780 -48166
PB,18-> -255 -14484
S,0-5 291712 121434
S,6-17 215726 54958
S,18-> 92955 42126
Source: Author
is given by
s∑
i=1
uir =
s∑
i=1
(
γir∑k
j=1 γij
ui
)
(28)
Recall from equation (24) that NCj is simply the total imputed value to member of target
group j relative to the total imputed value to the reference household/group r, i.e.
NCj =
∑s
i=1 uij∑s
i=1 uir
=
∑s
i=1
(
γij∑k
j=1 γij
ui
)
∑s
i=1
(
γir∑k
j=1 γij
ui
) = ∑si=1 γij∑s
i=1 γir
(29)
Thus, the equivalized in-kind income of household j is given by
∑k
j=1 nhj
∑s
i=1 uij∑k
j=1 nhjNCj
=
∑s
i=1
(
γij∑k
j=1 γij
ui
)
∑s
i=1 γij∑s
i=1 γir
=
s∑
i=1
(
γir∑k
j=1 γij
ui
)
=
s∑
i=1
uir (30)
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Figure 9: Absolute fiscal incidence, equivalent (needs-adjusted) and non-
equivalent income
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Source: Author
The distribution of absolute fiscal incidence mirrors of course the distribution
of relative fiscal incidence. When needs-adjusting, the group who recieves the
most recources are couples without children, aged 67->, with approximately
216’000 on average. Couples without children aged 45-66 acts as the biggest
average financieer, with a net transfer of approximately 68’000 on average11.
What do these results indicate? First off, there are large variations in fis-
cal incidence across groups. While some groups recieve less in public spending
than their tax payments, other groups recieve substantially more. The pat-
tern appears to be that typical “weak” groups recieve relatively large amounts
compared to “stronger” household types. When attempting to adjust for needs,
some of the picture changes. Couples with children in the age 0 - 17, who had
a relative fiscal incidence above 1 now has a relative fiscal incidence below, in-
dicating that after we control for needs, there is no additional “rents” allocated
to these groups. The elderly population’s and lone-parents’ fiscal incidence de-
clines both in relative and absolute terms as well, but they still appear as the
biggest winners of the fiscal sector. Of course, the elderly population has been
11When do absolute fiscal incidence increase when we use equivalence scales and when will
it decrease? As we see, it decreases for most groups, but for groups such as PUB,30-44 the
absolute fiscal incidence actually increase when applying equivalence scales. The reasons for
this can be illustrated easily. Let o, s and t be the amount of transfers, services and taxes
paid or recieved for each group, respectively. Let a superbar denote the equivalized value of
the corresponding variable. Then, we have that equivalized absolute fiscal incidence is higher
than the non-equivalized fiscal incidence iff (o¯− o) + (p¯− p)− (t¯− t) > 0. Each term within
the parantheses denotes the change in the respective variable when equivalizing. Notice that
all three terms will be nonpositive. If the last term is larger in absolute value than the sum of
the two first, the absolute fiscal incidence will actually increase when needs-adjusting. Thus
we would expect groups whose absolute fiscal incidence improves once we scale income are
groups who pay a large amount of taxes. The effect of scaling this down, in absolute terms,
will be bigger for them than the effect of scaling down transfers and thus the absolute fiscal
incidence improves. This of course illustrates that we should be careful with interpreting
absolute numbers.
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young once, and then belonged to households who were likely to be net finan-
cieers. We should be very clear of the fact that we are looking at this from a
purely static approach.
4.2 Fiscal incidence according to income deciles
After needs-adjusting non-cash income, I obtained the equivalized value of public
services. This is imputed to the respective income deciles accordingly. Adding
this to cash income and taking into account the estimated taxes, the relative
and absolute fiscal incidence for each income decile can be calculated12.
These values are given below.
Table 16: Relative fiscal incidence according to income groups
Decile Relative fiscal incidence
Decile 1 2,58
Decile 2 1,92
Decile 3 1,29
Decile 4 0,95
Decile 5 0,74
Decile 6 0,62
Decile 7 0,53
Decile 8 0,43
Decile 9 0,32
Decile 10 0,18
Source: Author
Figure 10: Relative fiscal incidence according to income groups
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12Note that, since cash income already is on the equivalized form and household type is
unkown, I cannot utilize equation (22). The result is that cash and non-cash income is
weighted equally, i.e. not weighted. Extended income of the household types and extended
income of the income deciles is therefore not directly comparable.
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Table 17: Absolute fiscal incidence according to income group
Decile Absolute equivalized fiscal incidence
Decile 1 53591
Decile 2 49896
Decile 3 21121
Decile 4 -3533
Decile 5 -25667
Decile 6 -42620
Decile 7 -59189
Decile 8 -85144
Decile 9 -122835
Decile 10 -258572
Source: Author
Figure 11: Absolute fiscal incidence according to income group
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Decile 1 recieves a net transfer of approximately 53’000 equivalent NOK,
while decile 10 pays a net transfer of approximately 250’000. There are large
differences in absolute fiscal incidence as we move up along the income distri-
bution, with a progressive pattern emerging.
4.3 Taxes, public spending and the income distribution
Knowing the fiscal incidence across groups, we can easily see how incorporating
this affects inequality.
The choice of inequality measure is the Gini index. Originally, the Bonferroni
measure was also considered. However, as demonstrated by Aaberge (2000),
the Bonferroni measure is particularly sensitive to changes that concern the
lower parts of the income distribution. The Gini-index on the other hand pays
more attention to changes that take place in the middle part of the income
distribution. Without having the entire income distribution, I have to estimate
the inequality measure based on predicted income distributions. In order to
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produce these estimates, I assume that income and taxes within each decile is
uniformally distributed. This is likely to produce biased tails. This is the reason
why the Gini-coefficient was chosen as an inequality measure in the first place.
A consequence of this assumed distribution is that the Gini-coefficient is likely
to be biased, probably downwards, meaning that I underestimate inequality.
For the sake of comparability then, I will estimate the corresponding Gini-index
before the fiscal incidence (but after direct taxes) is taken into account and use
this as a benchmark.
Let Xk be the cumulative population share and Yk be the corresponding
cumulative income share. Since we have 10 income deciles we have 11 data
points, i.e. k = {0, 1, ....., 10}, where X0 =Y0 = 0 and X10=Y10= 1
The Gini-index, G , is then approximated according to
G = 1−
10∑
k=1
(Xk −Xk−1)(Yk + Yk−1) (31)
To find this coefficient, the cumulative income shares have to be estimated
for each (hypothetical) distribution. By finding the average income in each
decile and rewriting (1) to solve for Disti, these can be identified.
Let I = equivalent income after direct taxes and cash transfers, II = equiv-
alent income after all taxes and cash transfers, and III = equivalent extended
income after all taxes. The distribution of income for each income measure is
given in table 18.
Once these income shares are known, finding the cumulative income shares
is trivial. Note that, as we introduce the other taxes and the value of public
services, the income share of Decile 1 - 5 increases, while decile 6’s is unchanged.
For decile 7 - 10 the income share declines. This indicates that inequality is
substantially lower once we account for all taxes and public expenditures. The
estimated Lorenz curves are shown in figure 12.
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Figure 12: Lorenz-curves
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Utilizing the values in table 18 we can estimate the predicted Gini-coefficients,
where the subscripts refer to what income measure is being used. These, as well
as percentage changes in the Gini coefficient when moving from i to the i + 1
income measure, are given in table 19.
Table 19: Gini-coefficients and percentage changes
Gini Coefficient %-change from Gini-coefficient above
GI 0,237 -
GII 0,215 -8,8%
GIII 0,182 -15,3%
Source: Author
Note: The reported Gini-coefficient from Statistics Norway was for 2007 0.244,
indicating, as predicted, that I underestimate inequality in the numbers given
above. The difference in benchmark Gini is approximately 2,8%.
Indirect taxes and the payroll tax reduces inequality. The marginal reduction
in Gini-coefficient from including these taxes relative to the benchmark is 8.8%.
We see that including the value of public services reduces the inequality measure
by an additional 15,3%, indicating that public services is more imortant in terms
of reducing inequality than indirect and payroll taxes.
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All in all, these results indicate that economic inequality is overestimated
with the traditional approach, at least if we believe that public expenditures
should be incorporated into an inequality measure. Once we incorporate more
than just direct taxes, as well as the value of public services, inequality declines.
This is in line with previous literature on the topic such as Aaberge et.al (2010
[2]). It is worth noting however that once we account for indirect taxes, the
payroll tax and more public services, inequality is reduced further than what
Aaberge et.al (2010 [2]) estimates.
‌
A final issue to assess is the impact on poverty incidence when taking the
fiscal incidence into account. Table 20 shows how the poverty incidence changes,
for two different poverty thresholds, when I replace income with extended in-
come.
Table 20: Risk-at-poverty
Threshold Poverty incidence %
(% of median) Income Extended income
50 7,89% 6,82%
60 9,22% 8,18%
Source: Author
Note: Income is scaled according to the EU-scale. Extended income is not needs-
adjusted according to (22) because of data limitations, instead the equivalized
non-cash income is added to equivalized cash income.
As we see, including the value of public services significantly reduces the
poverty incidence by 11 - 13%13. These results indicate that, not only is the
fiscal incidence important to take into account when measuring inequality, but
it is also important for poverty rates.
13The reduction in poverty incidence is smaller than that of (Aaberge et.al 2010 [2]). This
is likely to be caused by the assumptions invoked on the underlying distribution. A natural
sensitivity analysis would be to compare the results given here, found using aggregated data,
with a register-data approach. This is left for future research.
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5 Discussion
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss possible caveats with the methodology,
as well as briefly discussing pathways for futher research.
5.1 Methodology
5.1.1 Estimations
Estimations in general This thesis is rather “estimation-intensive”. Not only
do I estimate expenditures in the case of consumption and minimum quantity
parameters, but health multipliers and a large set of probabilities/utilization
rates are estimated as well. I have done my best to do everything correct, but
studies containing this vast amount of information will always be succeptible
to criticism. In hindsight, I feel it is important to approach the results in a
specific manner. The purpose of this thesis was to provide a description of the
system and certain features of it, given a set of assumptions and imputation
rules, rather than an “exact” representation. I hope that I have suceeded in this
goal, and that the marginal utility of such a thesis would be, even if the exact
kroner values or Gini-changes might differ from those in reality, positive. The
importance of trying to characterize the effects of the public sector is too great
to be discouraged from doing so.
Caveats with the insurance principle The insurance approach is derived
from the logic that the value of the relevant services should be scaled according
to factors taking into account the probability of a specific group being a user
relative to a reference group. The rationale for this is that, if individuals were to
aquire similar insurances in the private market, they would pay differential prices
based on their age and sex. A correct imputation formula would therefore be
consistent with what a private insurance company would charge the respective
groups.
In this thesis, I have scaled the costs up and down according to the relative
probability of being a user as well as the expected frequency of usage. For
public hospitals, a bit more sophisticated approach was possible, namely by
accounting for the costs of services recieved as well. In a perfect world, these
health multipliers should also take into account the variance of usage within
each group, at least if we think of insurance companies as to some extent risk
averse. Since I only had access to aggregated data, these variances were not
known. A better approach, left for future research, would be to utilize register
data to account for different variances as well.
The Gini-index The Gini-index reported in this thesis is a mere approxima-
tion of the actual. This is because I do not know the exact income distribution,
only the income shares of the respective deciles. The bias in my reported Gini-
index relative to the true value will thus depend on the validity of assuming a
uniform distribution of income within each decile.
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5.1.2 A general equilibrium solution
As hinted on early in the introduction, this thesis is of a more positive nature.
A general equilibrium solution of such a research question is way beyond the
scope of this thesis. Any behavioral effects and the corresponding implicit cost
of them are excluded from the analysis. Results should be interepreted with
care.
5.1.3 Multiple datasets
When estimating the consumption expenditures for the various income deciles
(see chapter 2 and Appendix B), I combined data from two different sources,
namely EuroStat and Statistics Norway, to measure one variable. EuroStat
numbers was used to estimate average incomes in each decile and Statistics
Norway data was used to estimate consumption expenditures as a function of
income for each group. The reason for having to utilize different sources is be-
cause average post-tax equivalent income is not available in Statistics Norway’s
Income Distribution Statistics, only the total distribution of income (the share
of total income that each income decile holds). Consumer expenditures are es-
timated with Statistics Norway’s data, and then the estimated average income,
found by using EuroStat data, are plugged into the estimated system. If the
EuroStat numbers are for some reason lower than the Statistics Norway num-
bers, indirect taxes are underestimated, and the opposite if Statistics Norway’s
numbers are lower. Different measurement techniques, classifications and so
forth could give rise to differences between the data. I was not able to uncover
such discrepansies while undertaking the analysis.
5.1.4 Paternalism
When thinking about these services, it is tempting to view them as services the
households are exempted from buying in the market and thus the provision of
them is a genuine service. If the households wouldn’t have purchased it in the
market if they had been given a cash transfer similar to the size of the service
imputed, is it correct to impute the service in the first place? This question is in
a sense of a normative nature - what is the willingness to pay of the households
for the various goods and services? From a welfare point of view, these aspects
should be taken into consideration. Unfortunately, it requires vast amounts of
information. The consequence of not accounting for such aspects is that we have
to be extra careful interepreting the results.
5.1.5 Corporate income taxes
The corporate income tax was excluded from the analysis, simply because of
no clear consensus in the literature on the approriate incidence assumptions.
What is the consequence of excluding this? Of course, it depends on what
the correct incidence assumptions are. If the corporate income tax is carried
by owners of corporations, excluding it from the analysis is likely to make the
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distribution of total taxes less progressive than what it actually is. As asset
wealth increases with income, the holdings of companies would likely increase as
we move up along the income distribution. Distributing the corporate income
tax proportionally to this would increase the average tax rate on the richer
income groups. The effect on the inequality measure is that excluding the
corporate income tax would therefore increase measured inequality since it falls
more heavily on richer consumer units, given the incidence assumption above.
5.1.6 Externalities and other issues related to public goods
Externalities A concept closely related to public goods is externalities, both
positive and negative. Externalities are often an important motivation for why
public goods are provided, i.e. because private agents fail to incorporate this
positive/negative effect into their valuation of the good. For instance, health
care and education are likely to generate positive externalities. In this thesis,
the total benefit of public goods is assumed to be equal to the total cost of
providing them, hence, in total there is no “aggregate externality” of the public
sector. This might be an inplausible assumption. However, since I analyze the
ex.post distribution of disposable income and extended income, any externalities
affecting these values are accounted for.
Investments vs. outlays Many public goods are typical investments, such
as infrastructure and education. The assumption used in this thesis is that these
expenditures generate benefits only within the same year as they are paid. Of
course, for education for example, we could in principle include the discounted
value of the additional future benefit each individual obtains from having utilized
the service. This is not done here.
Static vs. dynamic approach Related to the previous paragraph - this the-
sis is purely static. Dynamic benefits are excluded, such as education. It should
be kept in mind that, over the life-cycle, individuals move between household
types and thus recieve varying benefits. The numbers presented in the previ-
ous chapter measures only the static distribution of taxes and public spending
across household types for 2007. A life-cycle analysis of the public sector would
require more data than what was available to me.
5.2 Future research
5.2.1 Adding time
An interesting extension would be to look at how fiscal incidence develops over
time. Since the framework outlined can easily be applied to more years, a
natural next step would be to estimate the fiscal incidence for the same groups
over time and see how it evolves. Interesting research questions such as; who
are the prioritizatized groups of different governments? and is the welfare state
getting more or less generous? could be answered. We could then also estimate
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“incidence-adjusted” Gini-coefficients over time. This is especially relevant in the
wake of (OECD 2008). Are inequality actually increasing or is the rising Gini-
indicies a consequence of a public sector putting increasingly more emphasis on
the provision of public services rather than cash-income preservation?
5.2.2 More public goods
More public goods could in principle be added to the analysis. This is left for
future research. The justification for excluding most goods here is that they are
distributed uniformally across the population and, except for level values, have
less descriptive power. There are also time- and data-limitations.
5.2.3 Why cross-country comparisons of inequality is dangerous
The results in section 4.3 indicates that one should be careful when undertaking
cross country comparisons of inequality measures. Consider two countries who
are identical in the distribution of factor income, but differs in the prioritzation
between cash transfers and the provision of public services, as redistributional
tools. With the standard Gini approach, the first will appear to have less
inequality compared to the latter, however this is not necessarily the case, at
least not in welfare terms. For a better comparison between countries, a more
complete picture of the fiscal incidence should be taken into account. Aaberge
et.al (2010 [3]) is an example of work attempting to do this, where the values
of health and education are included into an extended income measure. The
authors there find that inequality and poverty are significantly reduced once
the value of public services is taken into account. Future research should build
on the framework used there and here, to account for more taxes and public
services in the measure of inequality. By doing this, inequality across borders
can be better compared.
5.2.4 A wealth-adjusted income distribution
When looking at the distribution of income it is important to recall what we
actually observe. An important aspect to keep in mind is that it is by no
means a complete description of the distribution of resources. For instance, as
mentioned in this thesis, income decile 1 contains a set of wealthy individuals
with zero taxable income who still pays a substantial (in absolute terms) wealth
tax. Therefore, the direct tax rate will be relatively high for that decile. As
long as one is aware of this, this is perfectly fine. However, as the income-
distribution is an important component in policy-making regarding poverty,
conclusions and interpretations will not be as clear as we would perhaps hope.
A possible solution to this is to construct a resource distribution measure.
For the purpose of creating a resource distribution, a common practice is to
create Wealth Adjusted Income, WAI. A typical WAI-measure aims to convert
wealth of the stock form to a flow variable. The (hypothetical) returns from
the current holdings of a wide array of assets is, in addition to imputed rents
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if the household/individual is a home-owner14, added to wage income to form
the WAI. While the WAI provides a wider picture than income alone, a few
improvements can be made.
First, by looking at the components included in regular WAI we have not
defined the entire consumption set. Obviously, in addition to providing annuity,
at least some assets can be liquidated at prevailing market prices to provide
consumption. From an Arrow-Debreu point of view, liquid assets are merely
consumption transferred across different states of the world. The option to
liquidate is always there if the realized state requires so, for the purpose of
consumption smoothing. It would therefore seem right that at least some dis-
cretionary amount of liquid wealth above annuity should be included into an
extended WAI.
Similarily, non-fungible stock wealth, such as the market value of houses, is
excluded from the WAI concept. The justification is that the transformation
from stock to flow is hard, except the imputed rents derived from it. However,
households/individuals can use these values as collateral to obtain loans which
increases the set of feasible consumption bundles. It should therefore, in some
manner, be accounted for.
Obviously, there is an intertemporal aspect here. Liquidating wealth and
borrowing today both has the same effect - less consumption is available to-
morrow. This should also be taken into account when constructing such a
distribution, however it is not clear exactly how this should be done. Working
further on the topic is left for future research.
14If he/she/they are multiple house-owners, second houses and so forth is considered an
non-fungible asset.
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6 Concluding remarks
The main insights from this thesis can be summarized in four points.
1. Even after adjusting for needs, there are large differences in the relative
relationship between taxes and public transfers (both cash and in-kind)
across household types and income groups. Groups who benefits the most
from the public sector are retiree-abundant groups, as well as households
with children (especially lone parents). This is because, not only do they
recieve relatively large amounts of cash transfers, but most public services
cater to these groups.
2. The Gini-coefficient obtained from the standard approach of looking at
post-(direct)tax equivalent income distribution overestimates inequality,
at least in the year covered in this thesis. This is most likely a general
effect. Accounting for indirect taxes and the payroll tax reduces the Gini-
coefficient from 0,237 to approximately 0,215. Incorporating the value
of public services into an extended income framework further reduce the
coefficient to 0,182. While these coefficients are likely to be biased in
the sense that they underestimate inequality, the effects illustrated are
believed to be real.
3. From the analysis, it appears that public services are more effective in
terms of reducing inequality than indirect taxation, perhaps because they
are to a larger extent designed to do just so.
4. When taking more taxes and public services into account, the poverty
incidence falls with 11 - 13%, depending on what poverty threshold is
used.
These effects indicate that fiscal incidence, even with uncertainty regarding
levels, is important, not only for the descriptive power itself but also for its
implications on inequality and poverty. Failing to account for the complete
incidence will give us less powerful descriptions of one important element in the
economy, namely the public sector, as well as a distorted view on the distribution
of economic well-being.
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A Data and assumptions
A.1 Data
All data obtained from Statistics Norway are extracted from “Statistikkbanken”,
(Statistics Norway 2012) and listed in table 21. Statistics Norway will be
throughout the table be referred to as “SSB”
A.2 Assumptions
Below is an overview over central assumptions utilized in this thesis. Most of
them stems from the fact that data used are highly aggregated.
• ASSUMPTION 115.
1. The age distribution of adults within PB,0-5, PB,6-17 and PB,18-> is
equal to the age distribution within PUB,0-29, PUB,30-44 and PUB45-66
respectively.
2. All children residing in the household is within the assigned age group.
• ASSUMPTION 2. There is no structural change in the effective indirect
tax rate from 2006 to 2007.
• ASSUMPTION 3. If Z is the set of variables affecting subsistence out-
put on all services to all target groups and T is the set of variables affect-
ing the allocation of discretionary spendings across all municipalities and
counties, then Z ∩ T = Ø
• ASSUMPTION 4. Income, taxes and public spending are uniformally
distributed within each income decile.
• Assumption 5. There is no systematic differences between the average
quality of consultations across age groups in terms of service recieved.
15What is the consequence of invoking this assumption? Related to the first point, it
should be noted than in terms of cash transfers and taxes, we know the exact averages for
each group. The bias from invoking the first point in assumption 1 will thus arise if there are
large differences in the actual recieved amount of public services and the amount the assumed
distribution recieves. Fortunately, adults within all these age groups recieve relatively similar
public services. It is therefore likely to believe that the results will not be affected much by
assuming this.
With regards to the second point, it will induce biases that increase in size as a larger share
of the households within each group have children that “belong” to other categories. This
arise for instance when there is a large number of years between siblings. It is worth noting
that the age intervals are relatively large. This increases the probability of assumption 1 not
leading to systematic bias.
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B An Almost Ideal Demand System
B.1 Theory
In order to estimate the average budget shares of the various consumption
categories, I estimate an Almost Ideal Demand System (with the unfortunate
acronym AIDS) (Deaton & Muellbauer 1980). The model is outlined in more
detail in its original paper (Deaton & Muellbauer 1980).
Define the log of an expenditure function which defines the minimium cost
of attaining a specific utility level u at a given price vector −→p as
log c(u,−→p ) = (1− u)log{a(−→p )}+ ulog{b(−→p )} (32)
where u normally lies between 0 (subsistence) and 1 (bliss). Assume that
a(−→p ) and b(−→p ) are positive linearly homogenous functions that can be regarded
as the cost of subsitence and bliss, respectively. The cost function is assumed
to be twice differentiable.
Define k different consumption categories, i = {1, 2, ...., k} and
log a(−→p ) = a0 +
∑
k
αk log pk +
1
2
∑
k
∑
j
γjk log pk log pj (33)
log b(−→p ) = log a(−→p ) + βo
∏
k
pβkk (34)
Inserting (33) and (34) into (32) we get the (log of the) AIDS cost function
log c(u,−→p ) = a0 +
∑
k
αk log pk +
1
2
∑
k
∑
j
γjk log pk log pj + uβo
∏
k
pβkk (35)
The α′s are the price effect of a change in the price of good k, whereas the
γ′s denote cross-price effects. The β′s are the income effects.
We see that, given that (36) is linearly homogenous, the following “adding-
up” restrictions must hold∑
i
αi = 1,
∑
j
γjk =
∑
j
βj = 0 (36)
Applying Shephard’s Lemma, we get the AIDS containing only observable
variables
wi = αi +
∑
j
γij log pj + βilog
(
X
P
)
(37)
where wi is the budget share of consumption good category i, X is the total
per household budget and P is a general price index.
In addition to the restrictions outlined in (37), three additional restrictions
is necessary, formally,
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∑
i
γij = 0∀i (38)
γij = γji (39)
Negativity (40)
The first restriction is a consequence of the fact that the demand function is
homogenous of degree zero, whereas (40) arise from Slutsky symmetry. The last
restriction, often referred to as the negativity condition (Mas-Colell et.al 1995),
implies that the Slutsky matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. if the matrix is pre-
and post- multiplied by the same vector, the result is nonpositive.
Even though theory imposes these restrictions, there are little empirical evi-
dence confirming them. Both the violation of the homogeneity restriction as well
as symmetry are somewhat frequently documented, see for instance Deaton &
Muellbauer (1980). The negativity condition is more seldom tested for. A possi-
ble approach to this problem is to estimate the constrained system of equations.
In this thesis however, I am interested in calculating robust expected consump-
tion expenditures instead of estimates conforming with theory. I will therefore
abstain from imposing the restrictions ex.ante.
‌
As in Deaton & Muellbauer (1980), the AIDS framework can be extended
to an income-equivalence framework so that (38) is written as
wih = αi +
∑
j
γij log pj + βilog
(
Xh
ehP
)
(41)
where eh is the equivalence scale so that per capita deflated total budget can
be thought of as a needs-based per capita budget. In principle, it can also be
extended to include household-specific slope-coefficients. This is not done here.
The coefficients obtained should therefore be thought of as average price and
real equivalent-expenditure effects across all household types.
B.2 Empirics
A possible problem related to the estimation of (42) is that the various price
indicies are highly correlated. If the explanatory variables are not independent
of each other but correlated to a “large” extent, the estimated coefficients lose
predictive power. Variance of the model increase, thus increasing the standard
deviations and reducing significance. In addition, coefficients are sensitive to
changes in model specification. This is symptoms of a high degree of multi-
collinearity.
To test whether multicollinearity was a problem, I regressed each explanatory
variable j on the −j other variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF),
given by V IF = tolerance−1 where tolerance = 1 − R2j were >100 for all
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explanatory variables, indiciating a severe multicollinearity problem. Three
possible remedies were considered.
The first-best approach to a multicollinearity problem is always to obtain
more and “better” (less correlated) data (Woolridge 2009). Unfortunately, be-
cause of different standard (consumption good classifications) for consumer sur-
veys before 1998, this was not possible.
The second option considered was running a Tikhonov regularization, also
known as a ridge regression. Ridge regressions will produce estimates with lower
variance, however somewhat biased. The rationale for doing a ridge-regression
is the bias-variance tradeoff. Unbiased estimators with high variance can be
traded off for somewhat biased coefficients with lower variance. I abstained
however from doing this estimation here.
The third and chosen method is actually two separate operations. Since
the price indicies are highly correlated, performing some sort of standarization
could reduce the correlation. By for instance looking at how much prices for
consumption good category j has changed, relative to the overall price level,
correlation could be reduced. Each price variable was therefore deflated by
the overall consumer price index P . The interpretation of the γ′s would then
be the effect on demand of an increase in the price of good j, relative to the
average good. Unfortunately, the correlations were reduced but not by much.
Performing the same VIF estimations, the problem appeared to persist. The
final remedy, since all the price indicies are telling much of the same story, was
to drop prices except the one corresponding to the dependent variable. The
price effect variable, γi, then measures the effect of a 1% increase in the price of
good category i relative to the average good, on good category i′s budget share.
The model estimated will therefore be the one given below, where subscript ei
denotes equivalent income.
wi = αi + γi log
(
Pi
P
)
+ βi log
(
Xei
P
)
(42)
The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows. αi is the default budget
share, i.e. what the budget share would have been if the price of the good was
identical to the average price and real oncome was 1. βi measures the change
in budget share of good i when real income increases by 1%. γi is the already
covered price effect.
To obtain these coefficients, I use data from the Consumer Survey of Statis-
tics Norway for the period 1998 - 2008. These data reports average consump-
tion expenditures on various categories, for different household types, for each
year16. The sector-specific and general price indicies are obtained from Statis-
tics Norway’s price statistics for the same periods. The Consumer Surveys cover
5 different types of households. These are; single individual households, cou-
ples with children 0-6, couples with children 7-19, couples without children and
single provider with young (0-19) children.
16As a matter of fact, Consumer Surveys are undertaken within 3-year intervals. The
numbers reported as average for year t in this paper is actually the average of the Consumer
Survey in the period(t-1 - t+1)
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Since (43) is on equivalent income form, budgets have to be scaled according
to the expected equivalence scale of the respective household types. Therefore,
the expected equivalence scales are calculated. The probability of having X
children, given that the household is in the relevant group, is multiplied with the
corresponding equivalence scale. For households with three or more children,
data is not reported, so these are given an equivalent scale corresponding to
a similar household with three children. All data are taken from Statistics
Norway’s demographic statistics.
In principle, (43) can be estimated in multiple ways. Two approaches is
especially popular when estimating such systems. The first is standard OLS,
equation by equation. An alternative is to estimate the system by Feasible Gen-
eralized Least Squares (known as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions). However,
the coefficients of OLS is consistent provided that the error term are uncorre-
lated with the regressors and has an expectation equal zero. I therefore estimate
the unrestricted system by OLS.
In addition to multicollinearity I was worried about heteroskedasticity be-
cause low-income households are likely to be budget constrained. While it
doesn’t affect the unbiasedness of the estimators, it makes inferences meth-
ods less reliable. It should therefore be tested for. When estimating the system,
I systematically obtained the residuals and regressed them again on the ex-
planatory variable performing a Breusch-Pagan test for all the residuals. If
the explanatory variables were able to predict the residuals to some extent,
heteroskedasticity would have been a problem and Generalized Least Squares
would have had to be applied. I did not however detect heteroskedasticity and
the t-statistics is thus, at least keeping the possibility of heteroskedasticity in
mind, reliable.
The results from estimating (43) are presented in table 22.
The perhaps most surprising fact is that the income effect sign on food is
positive, as it is in most studies reported to be a necessessity. This is likely to
be caused by the fact that, in my sample, families with children have higher
equivalent income than those who don’t. Other than this, most coefficients are
significant and have an intuitive sign.
When using these estimated demand equations, I calculate indirect taxes
paid in each income group by estimating expenditures on the different consump-
tion categories, using the estimated average wages from table 4 and subtracting
the savings rates from Halvorsen (2011) in the estimated demand system, before
multiplying the results with the indirect tax rates, taken from table 3. The final
results are given in appendix D. All estimated budget shares add up to a value
the interval [0.97,1.06], where the inaccuracies are at the lowest deciles. The
majority of the budget shares add up to approximately one.
B.3 Robustness
To investigate how well the zero-mean criteria is met, I plot the densities of the
error terms against a distribution N v N(0, 1). This is shown in figures 13 and
14.
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Figure 13: Density of residuals, equation 1 - 6
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Figure 14: Density of residuals, equation 7 - 12
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Even though the distributions do not exactly match those of an N v N(0, 1)
distribution, the mean of all residuals are zero. The different shapes of the
distributions are a result of too few observations.
The relationship between the distribution of residuals and an N(0, 1) distri-
bution can also be illustrated by QQ-plots - plotting the different quantile values
of a N(0, 1) with the corresponding values of the predicted distribution. This is
a useful non-parametric approach to compare the distributions of residuals with
that of a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 1. The
bands represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 15: QQ-plot equation 1 - 6
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Figure 16: QQ-plot, equation 7 - 12
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We see that in most cases we are within the 95% confidence interval of the
normal distribution. The QQ plots indicate however that a typical (and very
predictable) phenomena of the estimated distributions is that mass is moved
towards each tail. This is again likely to be a consequence of few observations.
59
C More on the estimation of the ABLM-model
This appendix contains more information with respects to the ML-estimation of
the minimum quantity parameters in chapter 3.4. The system was also estimated
by OLS without producing different conclusions.
Counties will be referred to as numbers in the graphs, as will equations, and
the number-county mapping is
Table 23: Counties and numbers
County Number
Østfold 1
Akershus 2
Hedmark 3
Oppland 4
Buskerud 5
Vestfold 6
Telemark 7
Aust-Agder 8
Vest-Agder 9
Rogaland 10
Hordaland 11
Sogn og Fjordane 12
Møre og Romsdal 13
Sør-Trøndelag 14
Nord-Trøndelag 15
Nordland 16
Troms 17
Finmark 18
Oslo 19
Source: Author
The coefficients from the estimation of (17) are given in table 24.
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Table 24: Complete estimation results of (17)
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Children, aged 16-18 112.056
[23.8]***
Children, aged 0 - 17 0.802***
[3.58]
Institutionalized patients 7.44*
[2.10]
Population 6.183*** 0.175**
[4.09] [3.07]
Population density 688.756*** - 16834*** -
[4.04] - [14.6] -
Share of population with at - - - -
least three years of higher ed - - - -
Average wealth tax. -47.93*** - - -
[-3,51] - - -
Source: Author
t-statistics in brackets. ***, ** and * denotes p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 re-
spectively. Insignificant variables are replaced with -.
Equation 1: Net. expenditures to secondary schooling, 1000 kroner
Equation 2: Net. expenditures to dentist services, 1000 kroner
Equation 3: Net. expenditures to administrative services, 1000 kroner
Equation 4: Net. expenditures to culture, 1000 kroner
As we see, population density increases both the cost of secondary schooling
and admininistrative services by relatively much. I suspected this is biased,
because of Oslo which, with a high amount of individuals and a low area, is
somewhat of an outlier. Since I am most interested in the minimum quantity
parameters, this is not vital for my analysis, unless it influences the estimate
of the relevant parameters. To correct for this, I estimated (17) with the log of
population density. It did not alter the minimum quantity parameters.
Except for the negative impact on expenditures to secondary schooling that
the average wealth tax has, I find little effects of variables likely to reflect het-
erogenous taste.
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Figure 17: Predicted versus actual values
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The figure above shows the actual and fitted values for the equations char-
acterizing the minimum quantities in the dentist and secondary schooling equa-
tions. Note that the values on the y-axis is absolute spending in 1000 kro-
ner, not per capita terms. On the right hand side, the corresponding residuals
(scaled according to standard deviations) are shown. As we see, the best fit is
when modelling secondary schooling expenses, where most residuals are below
1 standard deviation. When modelling net expenditures to dentist services, the
deviations for each observation is somewhat bigger.
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Figure 18: Predicted versus actual values
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When modelling net expenditures related to culture and net expenditures
on administrative services, predicated and actual values match fairly well, with
most deviations being less than one standard deviation.
We can get a sense of how the zero-expectation criteria is met by plotting
densities of the residuals relative to a N(0, 1) distribution. This is shown below.
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Figure 19: Density of residuals
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Taking the mean of the error term I find that all the average residuals are
zero. We can see however, that the distribution is not N(0, 1). This is probably
caused by having only 19 observations.
The corresponding QQ plots of the residuals are shown in figure 20.
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Figure 20: QQ-plots
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The QQ plots indicate that, while the two distributions are obviously related,
the observed distribution adds more mass to the tails than a normal distribu-
tion, just as in appendix B. It should again be emphasized that the observed
distribution is generated from 19 observations however, thus the difference is
likely to arise.
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D Intermediate results
D.1 Income groups and the various taxes as share of in-
come
Figure 21: Direct taxes and income groups








	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	


Source: Author
Except for the predictable progressive pattern across most income deciles, we
observe that the lowest decile paid higher direct taxes than the second lowest.
Some of this is attributed to the fact that the lowest income decile comprises
of wealthy individuals who have low or zero taxable income. They still pay a
large sum in wealth taxes, thereby making the direct tax rate high on average. It
should therefore be kept in mind that the lowest income decile, if we had removed
these wealthy individuals, would most likely have had paid a substantially lower
tax rate. Therefore, the results above is somewhat distorted if we interpret the
income distribution as a direct representation of the relative welfare of poor(er)
vs. rich(er). The income distribution is not wealth-adjusted.
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Figure 22: Indirect taxes and income groups
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Source: Author
The distribution of indirect taxes is largely progressive. This is caused by
varying consumption patterns across the income groups.
Figure 23: Payroll tax and income groups
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Source: Author
The distribution of the payroll tax is dependent on the composition of in-
come. As we move up along the income distribution, labor income becomes
increasingly important, and thus increases the payroll tax rate. However, for
the richest decile, the payroll tax rate decreases. This is caused by the fact that
capital income comprises of a larger share of their income relative to the other
income groups.
D.2 Various taxes as share of income and household types
In addition to being a function of the level and composition of income as well
as consumption patterns, total taxes is also dependent on the household type.
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Figure 24: Direct taxes and household types
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Source: Author
The direct tax rate varies largely across household types, with single parents
with kids in the age 0-5 paying the lowest direct tax rate and couples without
children pay the highest direct tax rate, both on average, with 12-13% and
28-29% respectively.
Figure 25: Indirect taxes and household types










Source: Author
Indirect taxes vary with consumption patterns, and one interesting obser-
vation is that these taxes are regressive in the sense that the “weakest” groups
identified above are the ones paying the highest tax rate. Since consumption
consists of many necessities adjusting slower than income, typical low income
group such as retirees and single parents will face rather high indirect tax rates,
relative to their income.
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Figure 26: Payroll taxes and household types








Source: Author
Not surprisingly, low employment groups such as the retiree-abundant types
pay a low payroll tax while groups with high employment rate pay a higher
payroll tax on average. In addition to expected employment, the payroll tax
rate is a function of sources of income and the geographical distribution of the
various household types.
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E A brief review on the literature of fiscal inci-
dence17
Research studying fiscal incidence including public goods began to emerge in
the 1940s. One of the first, seminal works came with Barna’s [6] study of
the UK economy. Barna identified substantial income redistribution through
the fiscal budget, far larger than what would have been observed if tax and
transfers progressivity alone had been investigated. Barna’s methodology has
since become a conceptual framework for undertaking studies related to the
topic.
In the 50’s, other studies ([?, 37, 10, 12]) all developed the framework for
fiscal incidence studies further, utilizing the emergence of more coherent, gen-
eral datasets. In the 60’s came two seminal papers ([19, 7]) by, respectively
Irwin Gillespie and George Bishop, critizing the previous literature and calling
for a revamp of the methodology used. Gillespie’s critique was related to the
limited scope of incidence analyses, while Bishop conducted an analysis using a
representative household for the economy.
Aaron & McGuire [33] also provided a seminal critique of the methodology
used in earlier studies and called for a more coherent way to combine theory with
empirical methodology. Paying especially focus on public goods valuation, Aaon
& McGuire offered a methodolgy of matching the theoretically correct valuation
of public goods (the true willingness to pay) with empirical moments. This
article, in addition to two later articles by Shlomo Maital ([29, 30]) divided the
field into two camps. The first camp continued the traditional “cost of service”
approach to incidence analysis. This methodology measures tax burdens and
public good distributions according to how much it generates in terms of revenue,
how much various services costs and which population units are likely to utilize
them. The sources of tax revenue and the recipients of public spending are
then identified and the taxes and expenditures are allocated accordingly. The
second camp focused more on the “behavioral” approach, seeking to look at more
normative implications of the fiscal system.
Notable, and more recent studies, containing similar methodology as used
in this thesis is [31, 8, 18, 20, 27, 41, 11]. In addition to [11], a substantial
survey of similar studies, as well as an excellent discussion of methodology, can
be found in [14]. For studies incorporating the fiscal incidence effect on the
income distribution and poverty, see [2] and citations within.
17For simplicity, I refer to each reference as its number in the reference list.
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